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ABSTRAK
Pemilihan presiden Indonesia (Pilpres) 2019 secara luas disorot sebagai pertandingan
ulang dua pemimpin populis antara Jokowi yang teknokratis dan Prabowo yang chauvinistik. Setidaknya terdapat dua dimensi yang berkontribusi terhadap atmosfir populis
pada Pilpres itu, yakni kondisi sosial-agama masyarakat dan penampilan pribadi calon
presiden. Dengan mengacu pada dua hal tersebut, sebagian besar analis menyebut
Prabowo lebih populis dibandingkan dengan Jokowi karena pidatonya yang energik dan
wacana chauvinisnya. Namun, tak bisa dipungkiri, polarisasi di tingkat akar rumput
sama tajamnya, baik di kalangan pendukung Jokowi maupun Prabowo. Lalu, sampai
sejauh mana seseorang dengan sikap dan retorika populis yang halus seperti Jokowi
dapat memiliki pendukung yang diwarnai sikap benci dan kondisi pasca-kebenaran
yang mendalam. Studi ini menggarisbawahi media sosial dan agen perantara sebagai prinsip tambahan untuk pembentukan kubu yang semakin jelas di antara kedua
pendukung. Dengan menggunakan analisis isi, penelitian ini mengungkap kekuatan
populisme dan pasca-kebenaran dari sejumlah kecil sampel twit dan komentar untuk
memahami bagaimana interaksi masyarakat dan para agen perantara dapat memperdalam perpecahan antara para pendukung populis dan kondisi pasca-kebenaran.
Penelitian ini menemukan bahwa, meskipun Jokowi dan Prabowo menampilkan gaya
populis yang berbeda di pentas politik elektoral, penyampaian wacana yang memecah
belah, provokasi, dan penghinaan marak dilakukan oleh agen perantara keduanya di
media sosial.
Kata kunci: Pilpres 2019, media sosial, pasca-kebenaran, populisme, agen perantara
ABSTRACT
Indonesian 2019 presidential election was extensively highlighted as a populist rematch
between the technocratic Jokowi and the chauvinist Prabowo. There were at least two
dimensions that contributed to the existing populist atmosphere at the presidential
election: the religio-social condition of the people and the personal appearance of the
presidential candidates. By referring to the two factors, analysts predominantly mentioned that Prabowo was more populist than Jokowi due to his energetic rhetoric and
chauvinist discourse. However, it is undeniable that the polarization at the grassroots
level was equally vitriolic in both Jokowi and Prabowo supporters. To what extent, then,
could a person with a subtle populist gesture and rhetoric such as Jokowi could have
* The author is a student at the Faculty of Communication and Multimedia, Universitas Mercu
Buana Yogyakarta.
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vitriolic supporters and a deep post-truth condition. The research at hand underlines
social media and middle-agents as additional tenets for the emerging entrenchment
between the two supporters. Using content analysis, this research unpacks the populism and post-truth energy of a small sample of tweets and comments to comprehend
how the interaction of the people and middle-agents could deepen populist cleavage
and post-truth condition. This research found that, although Jokowi and Prabowo envisaged a different populist style at the front of the electoral stage, the articulation of
divisive discourse, trolling, and mockery are equally sparkling from their middle-agents
in social media.
Keywords: 2019 presidential election, social media, post-truth, populism, middle-agents.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.7454/jp.v7i1.285

I N T RODUC T ION

The study of populism and post-truth was extensively growing in Indonesia, at least, since the surge of conservative Muslims toppled down
Basuki ‘Ahok’ Tjahaja Purnama, a candidate of 2017 Jakarta gubernatorial election, and spiking at the immediate aftermath of the 2019
Indonesia presidential election. The rally was a rematch of the 2014
election between Joko ‘Jokowi’ Widodo, and Prabowo Subianto. The
2019 election drew massive attention due to its novel social atmosphere
and political maneuver. It was orchestrated on a well-digitized political landscape and exhibited dense identity-based patronage. Various
works of literature and commentaries (Hadiz 2018; Margiansyah 2019;
Mietzner 2020; Putri 2019) highlighted the consolidation of Islamic
movement by staging their respective middle-agents, namely Habib Rizieq, Bachtiar Nasir, and many other whom sided with Prabowo. While
at the same, Jokowi seemed to be excluded from a similar highlight,
he was still identified as equally populist as Prabowo, but with less aggressive rhetoric.
It is noticeable that Jokowi and Prabowo had different populist maneuvers. Prabowo had to maintain the grassroots Islamic movement to
attract Muslim voters. In consequence, the respective middle-agents
must also frequently sow affective and emotional discourses to gather
the mass cohesively. By contrast, Jokowi tied himself to Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), one of the largest Muslim organizations in Indonesia, and
naming Ma’ruf Amin, a conservative cleric who gave a legal fatwa to
https://scholarhub.ui.ac.id/politik/vol7/iss1/3
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sentence Ahok, as his running mate. Hence, Jokowi had successfully
saved a lion’s share of Muslims’ support. These populist maneuvers infer different discursive structures. Prabowo’s middle-agents took blatant
techniques, namely streets and mass gathering, as discourse catalysts
which later echoed through social media. Meanwhile, Jokowi took a
noiseless and what seemed to be a middle-agent-free method.
Many scholars were more energetic to underline the boldness of
Prabowo’s rhetoric and discursive structure than Jokowi’s. The analysis often relied on a comparative study of the verbal quality of both
candidates (Hatherell and Welsh 2019; Margiansyah 2019). Populist
characteristics such as romanticizing historical glory, chauvinistic gesture, ostracizing ‘the other,’ anti-elite, invoking the heartland (imagined
community), self-declaring as ‘the mouthpiece of the people’ (Engesser,
Fawzi, and Larsson 2017) were hugely devoted to Prabowo more than
Jokowi (Gueorguiev, Ostwald, and Schuler 2019; Margiansyah 2019;
Mietzner 2020). In contrast, some observers noted Jokowi’s populism
by addressing his non-verbal qualities, such as blusukan (unplanned
visits), casual appearance, and closeness with the people in less developed areas, which echoed widely in social media (Hatherell and Welsh
2019; Margiansyah 2019). However, it left two unanswered questions:
first, to what extent can a candidate who had no blatant middle-agents
and less verbal quality of populism earn his discursive catalyst and be
sufficiently populist to be categorized as a populist. Second, if Jokowi
lacked discursive catalysts, how could the post-truth condition in his
capsule be adequately as solid as Prabowo’s.
Reflecting on the first question, the research at hand notes that the
role of middle-agents as discourse catalysts in populism scholarship
remains limited and is often scattered in its additional details. However, amid a vastly digitized political landscape, it is necessary to pay
equal attention to both verbal and nonverbal quality to address how
a political patron and his middle agents consolidate populism. In an
interconnected world such as today, platforms allow non-verbal political communications to replicate in a more decentralized way and give
middle-agents less restrictive authority to proclaim themselves as the
Published by UI Scholars Hub, 2021

3

Jurnal Politik, Vol. 7, Iss. 1 [2021], Art. 3

78

JURNAL POLITIK, VOL. 7, NO. 1, FEBRUARY 2021

‘mouthpiece of the people’ and nod toward certain affiliations. Given
that, besides utilizing verbal analysis, it would also be fruitful to extend
the threshold of nonverbal communications more than just appearance
and relational performance between candidates and the people, but also
include the middle-agents appearance and performative action in social
occasions, as well as relational performances between candidates and
middle-agents. Such attempts, related to the second question, aim to
trace how the relationship between middle-agents and the people creates an affective basis for post-truth politics. Thus, instead of giving a
detailed account of populist parameters and identification, this research
focuses on how the role of middle-agents in consolidating populism in
online space and how their direction could provide a basis for a posttruth condition during the Indonesia 2019 presidential election.
R ESE A RCH M E T HOD

This research embarks as a qualitative study of content analysis. Content analysis is not only beneficial to comprehend how the internet and
social media interact with political actions, regime transformations, and
digital control (Bradshaw and Howard 2018; Herring 2009), but also
helps to highlight how power flows through narratives, unpack manipulative interests, and so forth. The study of populism in content analysis is slightly growing due to the increasing trend of populist message
distribution in the digital space (Blassnig et al. 2018; Engesser, Fawzi,
and Larsson 2017). The attempts ranged from longitudinal research,
employing a massive amount of content scrapping in a selected period
(Blassnig et al. 2018; Ernst et al. 2017; Hameleers and Vligenthart 2019),
to critical analysis of content narrative (Engesser et al. 2017; Sengul
2019). However, both methods have their pros and cons. Longitudinal
research is more suitable for revealing macroscopic political patterns in
a certain period or comparing political trends in two or more countries,
while critical content analysis remains prospective to capture close-up
panorama between interrelated elements and actors.
The research at hand collects a small sample of tweets and comments from both structural and non-structural politicians as well as
https://scholarhub.ui.ac.id/politik/vol7/iss1/3
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ordinary citizens from February 11, 2018, to April 15, 2019, a period
where the heat of electoral contestation intensified in Indonesia’s political climate. To unpack its substance and relational position, this study
utilizes a few seminal insights from previous research, such as populist
communication opportunities and features (Ernst et al. 2017), as a pivotal point to reveal further relation between post-truth populism.
CONCEP T UA L F R A M E WOR K

Populist Communication and Post-Tr uth
Although the research at hand recognizes that there is no final concept
of populism, it is necessary to mention the minimal definition and its
recent development. Mudde and Kaltwasser (2017) argued that populism was a thin-centered ideology that consisted of antagonistic relations
between the ‘pure people’ versus ‘the corrupt’ elites and saw that politics
should be the expression of the general will of the people. However,
by considering diverse political contexts and developments in different
hemispheres, scholars have put forward the key elements of populism
(ideology, actor, and ‘the people’) into a more non-dichotomous nuance
(Postill 2018; Sengul 2019; Waisbord 2018). For example, the variety of
ideology has expanded from left-right to left-center-right (Mietzner 2020;
Postill 2018). However, a set of ideological preferences in a particular
country affects the characteristics of populism. In Europe and the US,
left and right-wing populists tend to swing their political narratives on
religious, racial, economic, and native-immigrant sovereignty issues.
Countries under a crime-ridden condition such as the Philippines, Brazil, or Mexico are inclined to use the ‘populist of fear’ (Chevigny 2003).
Thus, by reinforcing politics of hope and anxiety, Rodrigo Duterte won
the 2016 Philippines election through ‘penal populism’ (Curato 2017).
In Indonesia, theocratic and technocratic political tones represent rightwing populism and centrist populism in the 2019 presidential election
due to the vanishing leftist movement for decades (Postill 2018; Mietzner 2020).
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Given the diversity of ideology and cultural capital, the antagonistic
currency of populism also drew contextual roots. Some Western observers pointed to the failure of the neo-liberal system in providing a healthy
democratic climate amid technological, demographic, racial, and economic challenges as a catalyst for populist antagonism (Baron 2018;
Gerbaudo 2018). Meanwhile, others insisted that the antagonistic localities of populism consist of the complex entanglement of economic,
cultural, existential, and other factors which are prospective for further
explorations and irreducible for neo-liberal’s failure (Postill 2018). Thus,
criminals might be treated as ‘the other’ who threaten ‘the people’ for
populist actors in a crime-ridden country, where social security becomes
a prospective issue (Valiquette and Su 2018).
In the United States, for example, there is a clash of values between
older people, particularly whites—which revolve around jobs, economic
growth, and other things that people living in the Great Depression
and war era care about—and the values of multiculturalism, cosmopolitanism, and any sort of progressive agendas among American young
adults. This collision allowed Trump to antagonize non-white citizens
as villains who undermine traditional American values (Norris 2017).
In Indonesia, the antagonistic currency of populism occurred from the
long-standing, politically maintained racial and religious sentiments
surrounding the dichotomy of Muslims against non-Muslims, natives
(pribumi) against non-natives (especially those of Chinese descent), nationalism against communism, and Islamism against liberalism (Bourchier 2016; Kimura 2017; Tirtosudarmo and Hadi 2019).
In its localities, populism also has myriad forms of communications
to configure its triadic elements (the elites, the people, and the others).
However, it can be characterized by either its agency or political status.
The agency status points to whether a particular communicative action is orchestrated by humans, non-humans (bots), or a combination
of both. Meanwhile, the political status refers to the social and political capital of human actors have in consolidating the general will of
the people: they can either be structural or non-structural politicians.
Observers, as mentioned in the introduction, are favored to the direct
https://scholarhub.ui.ac.id/politik/vol7/iss1/3
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top-down communication between high-ranking political actors and
the people for the account of populism’s triadic elements, while the
intermediary positions of non-structural politicians are rarely included
in the account. In fact, non-structural politicians also take a significant
role in condensing grassroots consolidation and elevating electoral affinity for high-rank structural politicians. Thus, the promotor of populist
discourse may involve comedians, books, bots, community leaders, low
or middle-ranking politicians, and any sort of actors that ideologically
or culturally fits with the enclaves of the people, the others, and the
elites in a given society (see Kusumo and Hurriyah 2018; Toronto Star
2012; Viner 2016).
These multi-dimensional communications are inherently part of a
bigger frame of Chadwick’s hybrid media system where the net and realworld mutually fed and echoed each other, whether in formal forums
such as social media, campaign rally, or in the casual occasions such
as religious altars, face-to-face conversations, slums or squares (Postill
2018). This, however, points at the emerging trend of interdimensional
experience in which people comprehend and manifest their lives and
thoughts in both offline and online worlds as inseparable reality (e.g.,
Kalpokas 2019; Tirtosudarmo and Hadi 2019). The practice depends on
the populist’ ability to recognize discursive and political opportunities
in the respective country. Discursive opportunity refers to any societal
concern over ideology, culture, economics, or any critical affairs that are
deemed to have a disruptive impact when crafted in a communicative
message (Engesser, Fawzi, and Larsson 2017), even though such impact
would not be impactful when it is not supported by the speaker’s political position. In other words, political opportunity determines the possible directions for navigating the populist messages (Engesser, Fawzi,
and Larsson 2017).
At the same time, populist communication features, namely ostracizing the others, invoking the heartland or historical figures, emphasizing
the sovereignty of the people, and taking an anti-elites/establishment
stance (Engesser, Fawzi, and Larsson 2017), may become parts of a
larger attempt to put public feelings and opinions in a game of impulPublished by UI Scholars Hub, 2021
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sive interdimensional experience. These disruptive features encourage
divisive effects in society and configure the logical basis for its antagonistic political partisanship. Later, the accumulation of personal
emotions sublimed into ‘affect,’ in which individuals engaged in a will
of connectedness with a particular group and internalizing its cultural
and ideological norms, worldview, and frame of reference, where emotional alignment and discursive appropriation take place (Dӧveling,
Harju, and Sommer 2018). By the existence of an interdimensional
experience, personal emotions and communal affects not only circulate
across the spatio-temporal and societal boundaries, but also maintain
their continuation, reconfiguration, and contagion (Dӧveling, Harju,
and Sommer 2018).
Amid a digital-savvy political landscape, populism received a propitious communication space. Populist’ truth commitment, which stands
against scientific and liberal paradigms (Waisbord 2018), is mostly bestowed by the digital sphere in obtaining disputed arbitrary interpretations among political elites and the competing masses. Hence, facts,
opinions, and misinformation have become subjective artifacts in which
ideological and cultural pre-cognition operate in individuals and communal domains. This line is inherently part of where post-truth had
taken a role in populist communication. It does not mean that populism and post-truth are solely embedded in textual relativity or social
constructivism (Waisbord 2018). However, it engaged in a broader nuance that consists of complex combinations of textual fragility of social
media contents, personal emotions, communal effects, computational
manipulations, and cognitive biases (Gracia 1995; Lewandowsky, Ecker,
and Cook 2017; McIntyre 2018; Wooley and Howard 2019). The deteriorating democracy accompanied by the growing digitalization of media
smoothens populism in navigating their narratives, provides political
meaning, and constructs foundational will against the elites (Waisbord
2018).

https://scholarhub.ui.ac.id/politik/vol7/iss1/3
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R ESU LT A N D DISCUSSION

Populist Agency in Indonesia
Although the initial roots of populism in Indonesia have been noticed
since before New Order (Hadiz 2016), the embryo of populism was acquired significant development after the fall of the New Order in 1998
(reformasi). Reformasi would later determine the political and discursive structure of Indonesian populism motifs. Shortly before reformasi
erupted, the Islamic tarbiyyah movement, at the same time, was at its
high surge due to the accommodation of Suharto’s rule (Fuad 2020). In
1970–1998, the tarbiyyah movement predominantly targeted educated
youth groups by programming Bina Masjid Kampus and Latihan Mujahid Dakwah under the director of the Indonesian Islamic Dakwah
Council (DDII) and the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS) (Hilmy 2010).
The tarbiyyah movement taught their cadres four basic principles:
having a well-established basic Islamic knowledge, upholding Islamic
attitude and ethical principle (akhlaq), depriving themselves of idolatrous activities, and disconnecting themselves from anything related to
enemies of Islam (Fuad 2020). As few decades went by, the movement’s
cadres have been distributed in many strategic social positions, allowing
them to promote Islamic narrative in broader-cum-authoritative channels such as educational, social, and civil institutions. Some notable
alumni, like Salim Segaf Al-Jufri and Anis Matta, are holding strategic
structural political positions, which would later contribute to the rise
of Indonesian populism in recent years.
One of the major concerns for the tarbiyyah movement is that Islam
and politics are inseparable. Therefore, their struggles aimed to capture the formalization of Islamic values in Indonesia’s political system
(Fuad 2020). The tarbiyyah movement believed that the established
Suharto regime was corrupt and un-Islamic (Fuad 2020). This view was
a response to Suharto’s long-standing business with the military and
tycoons, who were mostly Javanese and Chinese. The racial division,
pribumi and non-pribumi, that re-emerged in the 1970s made Chinese
people considered as migrants (Tsai 2011). Given that historical back-
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ground, the Chinese were often perceived as Suharto’s cronies who have
widened the economic gap between natives and non-natives (Tirtosudarmo and Hadi 2019). As Kimura (2017) confirmed, the sentiment
towards Chinese people has not only crystallized from the 1990s to the
early 2000s but has persisted to the present day. Some latest research
(Lim 2017; Nadzir, Seftiani, and Permana 2019) even shows that this
sentiment evolved through myriad narratives in the digital space (Lim
2017; Nadzir, Seftian, and Permana 2019).
After reformasi erupted, the tarbiyyah movement, in which the members were mainly occupied under the PKS banner, evolved in a more
distributive way. The fall of Suharto allowed the spirit of unity to spring
in various concerns. Thus, the Islamic Defender Front (FPI), Hizbut
Tahrir Indonesia (HTI), Ahlussunnah Wal Jama’ah Communication
Forum (FKAWJ), and many similar organizations burst on to the scene
to pursue their Islamic agenda and express their freedom of speech and
union. Ahead of the 1999 general election, the revivalist party such
as the Crescent Star Party (PBB) was also established (Hilmy 2010;
Platzdasch 2009).
Although the political climate in the aftermath of reformasi tended
to be more democratic, this does not mean that it was free from Suharto’s influence. Suharto gave way to two sentiments that would continue
to this day (Mietzner 2013). First, Suharto’s New Order successfully
demonized the leftist-egalitarian movement and any unions or grassroots activism. Second, chasmic partisan and personal cleavages within
society make it inhospitable for leftist activism to be reborn.
Nevertheless, those historical outlines lead to an outcome of discursive and political opportunity. For discursive opportunity, it gives:
first, no discursive rival for Islamism except for nationalism. Hence,
the Islamist movements flourished at an unprecedented pace, accompanying the deepening nationalism among the state’s elites. Second,
Suharto’s leftist ‘ghost’ propaganda persists until this day and is politically exploitable, whether for the incumbent or grassroots organization
leader. Third, sympathy for leftist or egalitarian discourses often faces
resistance, either from the established regime or from Islamist groups.
https://scholarhub.ui.ac.id/politik/vol7/iss1/3
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In other words, today’s political discourse was deeply rooted in Indonesian political history. It gives long-standing tangled memory, affect,
imagery, longing, and hope for society and political elites to project
today’s concerns and agendas.
Besides, it cast the pattern for the structural and non-structural political opportunities in the 2019 presidential rally. In the Islamist line,
many notable tarbiyyah alumni held influential positions in today’s
socio-political affairs, either in structural or non-structural ones. Salim
Segaf Aljufri, for instance, served as the 2015–2020 PKS’ Majlis Syura
(the consultative council) leader. However, the position is not always
linear between an individual’s background and an organization’s ideology. Yusril Ihza Mahendra, a 64-year-old lawyer, has since 2015 became
the chairman of the Crescent Star Party (PBB), one of the Islamist
party. A prominent organization for the 2016 mass rally against Ahok,
GNPF-MUI, was once headed by a prolific preacher, Bachtiar Nasir,
before Yusuf Martak, an ex-Vice President of PT Energi Mega Persada
(Raditya 2019), took his position in 2017.
At the grassroots level, the flourishing Islamism influenced the growing number of young preachers with an incredible number of social
media followers. Some of them displayed Islamist undertow in their
social media accounts and did not hesitate to perpetrate political endorsement and disagreement during the 2019 presidential election. Felix
Siauw, a preacher of Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia with millions of followers
in multiple social media platforms, for instance, consistently advocates
the formalization of a khilafah (caliphate) government and criticizes the
established regime (Weng 2018) in social media, accompanying HTI
spokesperson Ismail Yusanto in handling the public discourse through
mainstream media. Those, however, were the coalescing names surrounding the vibrant-cum-charismatic leader, Habib Rizieq Shihab, of
Islamic Defender Front (FPI)—a vital token for Prabowo’s presidential
rally beside his financial supporters, business moguls such as Hasyim
Djodjohadikusumo and Sandiaga Uno (Mietzner 2020).
In contrast to Prabowo’s group of supporters, which are mostly composed of religious and political elites, the secular nationalist camp has
Published by UI Scholars Hub, 2021
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a more nuanced spectrum of political opportunity, stretching from religious, political, and cultural elites. During the aftermath of Aksi Bela
Islam in 2016 to the 2019 election, NU cadres widely filled strategic
positions. Ma’ruf Amin, who would later be named as Jokowi’s running
mate, was the Indonesian Ulama Council (MUI) leader at that time.
The nomination of Jokowi’s vice-president candidate was also orbiting
around names such as Muhammad Romahurmuziy and Muhaimin Iskandar, who was chairmen of the United Development Party (PPP) and
the National Awakening Party (PKB), respectively. In addition, among
the non-structural actors who backed Jokowi are Candra Malik, a cultural enthusiast who followed one of NU’s most respected figure, Habib
Luthfi Yahya, in endorsing Jokowi; and Mukti Ali Qusyairi, who is the
author Ulama Bertutur Jokowi (2018), a book that serves as a counternarrative for allegations against Jokowi (Defianti 2018). Meanwhile, from
established parties, there were names such as Airlangga Hartanto of
Golkar; media tycoons and party leaders, Surya Paloh (Nasdem party)
and Hary Tanoesodibjo of Perindo also gave their support for Jokowi
through the nationalist group.
These Islamist and nationalist political opportunity structures reflect
the ideological position of populism in Indonesia, whether moguls stand
behind both sides structurally or not. Following the line, the 2019 presidential campaigns are notoriously known to be funded by natural industry oligarchs (Morse 2019). According to Prabowo and Sandiaga Uno’s
campaign manager, 98 percent of their electoral fund came from the
businesses of the two candidates (Debora 2019). Sandiaga Uno provided
$8.1 million, or 61 percent of total campaign expenditure, from his energy, mining, agriculture, and infrastructure businesses. While JokowiMa’ruf received approximately $9.2 million, or two of third of the total
electoral budget, from shadowy funding, Perkumpulan Golfer (Golfer’s
Club), and other names such as Luhut Binsar Pandjaitan (Morse 2019).
Accordingly, five tenets can be pointed out from Prabowo and
Jokowi’s political agencies. First, besides earning electoral affinity from
oligarchic support, both candidates also used non-structural agents to
generate social support by benefiting from the existing feeling of crisis
https://scholarhub.ui.ac.id/politik/vol7/iss1/3
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from the respective groups. Second, while Jokowi used diverse nonstructural agents ranging from a cultural enthusiast, prominent ulama,
book authors, and so forth, Prabowo had a smaller spectrum of nonstructural agents that mostly are religious figures. Third, these layers
created different realities between grassroots political perceptions and
elite political agenda. These contrasting realities, arguably, reflected
the ideological orbit where Islamism and nationalism are undertaken
by oligarchic interest. Fourth, the middle-agents bridged the grassroots
political perception to fit with the elites’ political agenda. Fifth, this did
not only exemplify that the political elites were indebted to a particular
community patron (Hadiz 2018) but were also indebted to the larger
strands of non-structural agents, especially the online ones.

Online Environment of Populism in Indonesia
Indonesia’s online sphere has been a fertile ground for nefarious deeds
since its emergence. Factors such as poor media literacy, poor-designed
regulations, and a lack of democratic commitments are key factors in
point (Paterson 2019). According to the 2017 APJII Survey, there are
143.26 million internet users in Indonesia, with 41.55% utilized online
platforms to consume religious information, while the other 50.26%
chose to read political information. This evidence shows that the arable
prospect for emotional exploitation in Indonesia’s political communication has been laid before the 2019 presidential election.
In pertinence to that, the Ministry of Communication confirmed
that there were approximately 26 of 38 blocked websites that spread
religious and political misinformation in 2018. However, the response
against that digital malaise remains limited around bureaucratic preventions, namely: Gerakan Literasi Nasional by the Ministry of Culture and
Education; which encourage the national cyber authority, Badan Siber
dan Sandi Nasional (BSSN), to curb malicious contents; and cooperate
with MUI to release fatwa against misinformation and hoax (Arwendria
and Oktavia 2019). More substantial threats such as a lack of democratic
commitment, computational propaganda, and blatant populist rhetoric
(Engesser, Fawzi, and Larsson 2017; Margiansyah 2019) were beyond
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the reach of those preventions and remained entangled until the voting
day. Consequently, political parties and private contractors became the
main conductor for bots and human agents in engineering the media
sphere in Indonesia. The works of these manipulative agents consisted
of boosting support for the favored political affiliation, attacking their
opponents, and creating polarization of public opinion (Bradshaw and
Howard 2019).
Blatant misinformation from misleading sources and implicit ‘truthiness’ from political actors may tap the individual beliefs and feed public
emotions. Thus, even before the election day, the problem of Indonesia’s online sphere was that the preventive policies remained prone to
the practices of broadcasting misinformation, implicit post-truth, and
antagonistic populist rhetoric. Prabowo, Jokowi, and their agencies are
the cases in point. For example, the incumbent plays two paradoxical roles in the electoral game: verbally condemning the practice of
misinformation while at the same time politically practicing media
manipulation. In July 2018, Jokowi urged the people to use their ballots
wisely and be aware of online manipulations (Ratnasari 2018), but on
April 16, 2019, a day before the election, the excessive force of buzzers
is deployed on Twitter, amplifying Jokowi’s tweet (Fahmi 2019).
Similarly, the opposition was also on account doing the same thing.
On April 15, 2019, Prabowo’s coalition parties told the public to avoid
misinformation mindfully (Putri 2019). However, the day after the message was broadcast, a few of Prabowo-affiliated influencers successfully created a pseudo-organic conversation on Twitter, beating Jokowi’s
buzzer force in the level of interaction (Fahmi 2019). Besides computational engineering, both candidates also exhibit religious discourses
to attract their respective supporters. However, the implications went
too far.
In the short period before the election, Jokowi embarked to Mecca
for Umrah. A photo of him entering Ka’bah was uploaded on his social
media. Similarly, Prabowo also posted his religious activity on Twitter to
celebrate the election day (see figure 1). Since the polarization among
the public kept sharpening from the 2016 demonstrations against Ahok
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to the date of Jokowi and Prabowo’s pious tweets were uploaded, they
could not escape from interpretative polemics among the public. The
post-truth condition occurred from the dissent of beliefs, not from a
dichotomy of fact versus emotion (d’Ancona 2017; McIntyre 2018).

Figure 1. Jokowi and Prabowo’s Tweet for Performative Religious Discourse

Following Maurer’s (2016) postulation, when one is involved in political
practice, the one’s verbal or non-verbal activities are always bounded
in political interpretations linking a set of the cultural or ideological
history of his or her audience to figure out the respective performance,
either glaring rhetoric, pretentious deed or promise, or a subtle body
gesture or visual appearance. The tweets at hand and Maurer’s line
are not the point for the postmodernist version of post-truth, where
reality is created in an individual’s mind (d’Ancona 2017; Fischer 2020;
McIntyre 2018). Instead, they refer to the social constructivism version
of post-truth, where different ‘beliefs’ competing for a reality outside
the mind (Fischer 2020). Figure 2 shows that the competing beliefs
among supporters are an inherent part of these religious tweets: Jokowi
and Prabowo supporters believed that their individual beliefs are true
and that their opponent was wrong. By uploading the portrayal of sacred and pious moments, both candidates represented a contestation in
earning electoral affinity from Muslim voters, despite inviting vitriolic
comments from the opposing supporters.
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Figure 2. Comments from Jokowi and Prabowo’s Tweet in Figure 1

Another pious occasion of Jokowi and Prabowo also took place a few
days before the election day. On April 13, 2019, Jokowi met Habib
Luthfi Yahya and KH Maimoen Zubair before his campaign rally in
Gelora Bung Karno Stadium (Kuwando 2019). The video of Habib
Luthfi Yahya welcoming Jokowi in Gelora Bung Karno Stadium, which
was uploaded on April 14, 2019, by Candra Malik received 7,400 views
(figure 3). Similarly, on April 13, 2019, a tweet from Dahnil Anzar
Simanjuntak showed the photos of Prabowo and Sandiaga Uno visiting a prominent television preacher, KH Abdullah Gymnastiar, widely
known as Aa Gym, amassing 2,600 likes. In these tweets, the political
interests and religion as a social capital interacted with each other and
exemplified how the middle agents manage their positions to convert
their social capital for the desired political outcome. By displaying religio-political affiliation of their patron, both influencers directed their
audience where to align.
Worth noting that there was a different communication style between Malik and Anzar in guiding the audience to a particular political
affiliation. In addition to being NU’s influential cultural icon, Malik
placed himself as a Habib Luthfi Yahya student. In other words, he
showed his audience that he was an internal part of a religious community, not a part of the political elites. In contrast to Malik, Anzar placed
his position under the banner of the political elites, not behind the
lines of Aa Gym. Subsequently, their affiliative position determined the
https://scholarhub.ui.ac.id/politik/vol7/iss1/3
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discourse that ideologically plausible to feed the beliefs of the partisans.
By referring to Habib Luthfi Yahya as an authoritative figure, Malik
implied that Jokowi was the chosen political side for NU. Meanwhile,
the devotional process from Aa Gym to Anzar’s patron illustrated that
Prabowo and Sandi were virtuous candidates for the presidency and
vice presidency. Both Malik and Anzar employed the argumentum ab
auctoritate strategy in their religious discourse. The difference was that
Malik tended to emphasize Habib Luthfi Yahya’s charisma, while Anzar
was inclined to highlight Aa Gym’s virtuous advice as a representative
testimony of the Muslims.

Figure 3. Malik and Anzar’s Tweets; Jokowi and Prabowo Meet Different Religious Leader.

The examples above show that the affiliative border for the audience is
disciplined by the charisma of a religious figure. Religious influencers,
however, play a role as the coordinator to put the people under a clear
community demarcation. Furthermore, the encounter of religion and
politics has made spirituality embedded in populist online communication. Then, the notion of freedom of political choice expands into
a fear of betraying a religious leader. This puts politics no longer be
based on scientific evidence but instead based on religion as a source
of alternative truth, where believing in non-empirical claims credited
as part of faith is emphasized (McDermott 2019). Thus, recognizing
which candidate the respective religious leader is inclined to may affect how the audience calculates the afterlife consequence of a political preference. In other words, what, where, and whom from a subtle
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movement of political safari may impact the affective basis and logic
of the people. Influencers, regardless of their religious, political, or
educational background, disseminate populist messages or viewpoints
directly or indirectly on Twitter by occasional will. This perhaps is the
development of where the echo of populist zeitgeist migrates gradually
from conventional media (Hameleers and Vligenthart 2019) to the digital one with its myriad forms and facilities of communications.
Additionally, trolling and populist communication feature takes
place beside the middle agents religious rhetoric in endorsing a presidential candidate. Figure 4 envisages that middle-agents employ a sort
of intertwined strategy of post-truth and populist communication, like
preferring to use facts that support their beliefs or political stance; mockery; and emphasizing people’s will. As Prabowo’s endorser, Anzar’s tweet
contained ‘emphasizing people’s will’ feature to sharpen the news’s impact on public opinion. While in Jokowi’s camp, Denny Siregar added
a simple caption of mockery on a news headline he captured. In line
with their difference in news preference, both Anzar and Siregar’s captions also exhibited different framing. Anzar portrayed his tweet as a
serious matter, while Siregar tended to trivialize the issue at hand. They
may not interact intentionally on Twitter, but their impact on public
opinion may be severe. Both tweets led to the entrenching belief that
each candidate committed electoral fraud. (See figure 5).

Figure 4. Denny Siregar and Dahnil Anzar Citing Mainstream Media News
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In relevance to that, the atmosphere of moral sentiment was strongly articulated in the reply section (figure 5). Supporters of Jokowi in Siregar’s
tweets and Prabowo’s supporters in Anzar’s tweets expressed myriad
narratives and reasoning to maintain their belief from unfavorable facts.
However, the audience’s response ranged from conspiratorial analysis,
incitement, mockery, and even pious grievance. These replies represent
the mixture of various strands of emotions on how each side debunks
their opponent. In the case at hand, post-truth emerged neither from
hoaxes nor fake news but rather from tailored facts and fragmented
ideologies. Although the middle-agents cannot be blamed for the entire
situation, they remain hugely contributive to the occurring atmosphere.
Connotative and denotative meaning in a news headline, where the
news is reposted, who posts the news, and what captions are written, are
a kind of determinant factors whether the post-truth condition may take
place in an audience, in addition to the ability of the populist actors to
ignite affiliative emotions and throw fragmented meanings (Engesser
et al. 2017; Esser, Stępińska, and Hopmann 2017; Waisbord 2018).

Figure 5. Comments from Siregar and Anzar’s Tweet
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Siregar and Anzar’s tweets exemplify that, first, mainstream media can
neutrally spark, embolden, or legitimize the populist messages of middle agents (Blassnig et al. 2018; Esser, Stępińska, and Hopmann 2017).
Second, although the middle agents’ tweet may contain no populist
communication features, other forms of technique, namely mockery
and trolling, may take place as its substitute. Third, populist communication feature such as ‘ostracizing others,’ ‘emphasizing people’s will,’
and ‘invoking the heartland’ is eminent in the reply section. However, a
similar style is also prominent within structural politicians’ tweets with
broader employment of affective basis and ideological affiliation, as the
following transcript shows:
PBB will act as Islamic opposition forces, defend Islam, the nation,
and the state from bankruptcy and its downfall! [Original: PBB akan
tampil sebagai kekuatan oposisi Islam, membela Islam dan membela
bangsa dan negara dari kebangkrutan dan keruntuhan!]. (Mahendra
2018a)
During the pre-election times, Crescent Star Party stands as one of
the leading supporters of Aksi Bela Islam serial demonstrations. PBB’s
leader, Yusril Ihza Mahendra, exemplified the populist feature of ‘advocate for the people’. Mahendra played a polarized role between ‘the
Muslim’ (the ‘pure’ people) and ‘the corrupt elite,’ which was framed
as a devastating threat to Islam’s sustainability. Furthermore, he called
for defense on Islam with a broad segmentation range:
The jargon of the fight for the oppressed is our platform. We fight for
the Muslim community and anyone who is wronged and repressed
by the regime. We do not theorize; we act! [Original: Jargon pembelaan terhadap kaum terzalimi adalah platform kami. Kami membela
umat Islam dan membela golongan mana saja yang terzalimi dan
tertindas oleh penguasa. Kami tidak berteori, tapi kami bertindak
di lapangan dengan tindakan nyata]. (Mahendra 2018b)

https://scholarhub.ui.ac.id/politik/vol7/iss1/3
DOI: 10.7454/jp.v7i1.285

20

Haq: Patronizing the Mass: How Middle-Agents Deepened Populism and Pos
PATRONIZING THE MASS

95

Another way to engage the audience to an emotional affiliation is by
bringing up historical figures or the motherland that longs for glory.
The use of these figures is to promote the convergence of a context, in
which the imagination of ‘the ideal’ and ‘the utopia’ or ‘the nonideal’
and ‘the dystopia’ influences the audience’s status-quo perceptions.
Consequently, it might affect the audience’s political stance. As Fahri
Hamzah tweeted:
Our founding fathers wanted themselves to be the manifestation of
the general will of this country. Bung Karno, for example, claimed
himself as The Mouthpiece of the Indonesian People. [Original:
Para pemimpin kita dulu, ingin dirinya menjadi penjelmaan dari
seluruh kehendak rakyat negeri ini. Bung Karno misalnya, menyebut
dirinya sebagai Penyambung Lidah Rakyat Indonesia.]. (Hamzah
2018)
A similar effect also applies when the populists use anti-elite or antilegal elite articulation:
#SupportYIMPunishKPU; Do not let your hatred against a certain
group makes you inflict injustice upon them. PBB is my party; the
star and crescent is my banner [#DukungYIMPidanakanKPU; Janganlah kebencianmu terhadap satu golongan, membuatmu berlaku
tidak adil... PBB partaiku..Bulan bintang panjiku]. (Hasan 2018)
Hasan’s tweet emphasized the true representation of the people’s will.
The tweet expressed a sense of delegitimization of a state-operated institution. Hasan calls for the people to delegitimize the Election Commission (KPU). He believed that the established elite had derogated
the people’s will.
Transcripts of structural politicians’ tweets exhibit a sort of affective
grammar referring to Islamism. Glittering generalizations, institutional name-calling, and claiming as the people’s mouthpiece foster not
only emotional engagement but also embolden the way how Muslims
are supposedly treated. Following Engesser et al.’s (2017) words, “the
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fragmentation can be an ‘inherent incompleteness’ of populism that
encourages the individual social media user to be able to complement
fragments of populist ideology with various additional ideological elements and tailor it to her or his specific political attitudes.”
CONCLUSION

Middle-agents have had a strong influence in creating a populist atmosphere during the 2019 presidential election. Their social capital
and ability to optimize digital media gave resonance for the public to
comprehend bigger discourses that fit with their preferred ideology.
Some of the structural and non-structural politicians spread pious but
fragmenting, taunting, and conspiratorial messages to seduce the audience into a particular stance of ideology, political attitude, or arbitrary
interpretation. This left inconclusive or even vicious perceptions of reality among each partisan. Thus, although each presidential candidate
might only show populist rhetoric, gesture, or appearance, it seems that
online interactions among the masses and influencers ignite a posttruth condition, not just because of the emergence of tailored facts,
but also due to the affiliative influence among individual social media
users. Additionally, although Prabowo and Jokowi have contrasting maneuvers in the offline world, their middle-agents had equal power to
spark moral sentiments in the online space.
Thus, it is important to revisit the notion that Jokowi and Prabowo
barely received their populist status on their character and political
gestures (Margiansyah 2019). The status is credited to the result of the
work of their middle-agents and the spread of online communication. In
other words, instead of blaming the candidates for the existing populist
condition, it seems that the middle-agents and online activities contribute more to the current populist climate in Indonesia—in addition
to the long-standing religious, socio-cultural inequality, and oligarchic
networks fueling its frameworks in the real world (Fossati and Mietzner
2019; Mietzner 2020).
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